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INTRODUCTION
In the 1950s, the American steel industry dominated the
world in steel production.

It was a strong and thriving

sector of our national economy.

Throughout the 1970s, however,

the steel industry has been in sharp decline.

Foreign com

petition, high labor costs, periodic recessions, and lack
of modernization are some of the factors that have contributed
to the industry's inability to produce steel in a competitive
market.

These developments in the steel industry have affected

not only our national economy but also the lives of one million
steelwo~kers.

The ugly economic and social effects of. unemploy

ment have caused hardship for many steelworkers,particularly
in the Midwest and the Northeast.
Because most of the closing steel plants are concentrated
in this particular area, a serious regional problem has developed.
Towns heavily dependent on the steel industry for jobs have
suffered and continue to suffer from high rates of unemployment,
a situation that is exacerbated by our current recession.

If

workers are not receiving income, they cannot continue to sup
port the other businesses in the community.

Local enterprises

that rely directly or indirectly on the area steel plants are
likely to suffer losses and may have to

lay~off

workers.

Depart

ment stores, restaurants, and entertainment houses may also
close down from lack of customers.

Because small towns depend

on each other for goods and services, this economic decay has
spread geographically, particularly with more and more steel
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plants shutting down in the same area.

Like the simple

Keynesian multiplier, these negative effects have mUltiplied
throughout the Midwest and the Northeast, causing severe economic
problems for a key part of the country.
The hardship caused by closing a steel plant, however,
is not strictly economic.

In a study done on the psychological

and medical effects of unemployment, Sidney Cobb and Stanislav
Kasl found that job loss can lead to short- and long-term health
effects, such as ulcers, diabetes, and hypertension. 1 Further
more, a study done by Harvey Brenner concluded that the 1.4
percent rise in the unemployment during 1970 was directly re
sponsible (nationally) for some 51,570 deaths, including 1,540
additional suicides. 2
As one would expect, many steelworkers have attempted to
better their situation by migrating to the South and Southwest,
where jobs are more plentiful. Yet more workers seem unwilling
to make such a move because they do not want to leave the towns
they grew up in or that they have family, and established friends
in.

Thus, as resources are transferred from aging steel mills

to higher growth industries, the loyal steelworker is left be
hind to bear the costs.

Unemployment, psychological stress,

and economic decay are the short-run effects of allocative efI

ficiency on thousands of steelworkers throughout the Midwest
and the Northeast.

A solution needs to be found that would ease

these costs by maintaining job stability.
The solution that I propose respects community ties, places
a high priority on employment and allows workers to decide their
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own economic future.

If a steel mill closes down, the workers

should be given the opportunity to purchase it and run it them
selves.

This would make workers directly responsible for the

success of the plant and the maintenance of their jobs.

No

longer would they be at the mercy of some far away corporate
headquarters.

It is the position of this paper that given cer

tain conditions worker ownership of steel plants can be effective
in maintaining regional unemployment stability in the short-run.
For the purposes of this paper, the terms: "worker owned and em
10yee owned firms," and "cooperatives" all describe situations in
which workers own the enterprise, and control the enterprise's de
cisions.

For further clarification, this paper is divided into

six sections.

Section one looks at the historical problems in

the steel industry, tracing the origins of its 01igopo1istic
market structure and its loss of market position.

Section two

analyzes the differences between an employee owned firm and a
traditional firm.

Section three deals with the problems faced

in establishing a worker owned firm, particularly the problem
of obtaining finacia1 capital.

Section four discusses two

different cooperative structures and analyzes their effective
ness.

Section five puts forth a model of worker ownership for

a steel firm and evaluates this mode1's effect on productivity
and investment.

And finally, section six points out the short-run

applicability of worker owned firms to steel shutdown situations.
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Section I:

A Historical Perspective on the Steel Industry
and its Problems

The steel industry is an important part of our U.S. economy.
Because of the number of workers the industry employs (close to
one million), changes or problems within steel have serious im
plications.

In 1950, America's steel industry was the strongest

and most powerful in the world, accounting for 50 percent of
the world's steel output.

Today, however, the United States

accounts for less than 15 percent of the world's steel output
and is the fourth largest steel producer--behind the Soviet
Union, the European Community, and Japan. 3 As steel mills
close down and workers lose their jobs, more and more people
begin to wonder what has happened to this once booming industry.
This section looks at the steel industry's development over
time and evaluates the factors that have pushed it into decline.
First, the vertical integration in the steel industry has re
sulted in large firms and an oligopolistic market structure.
Second, the industry's pricing policy is discussed.

Then the

effects of declining raw material prices, declining shipping
costs, and the diffusion of new technology in the 1950's and
60's are evaluated.

The section concludes with a discussion of

the steel industry's response to its declining market position
and the implications of that response.
In the early part of this century, many steel firms began
to buy deposits of coal, iron ore and limestone.

These ffrms

also began to integrate the process of production by combining
the preparation of materials, the smelting, the refining, the

5

rolling t and the finishing at one location.

This type of in

tegration was beneficial to the firm since the pig iron and
steel could be kept at high temperatures as it moved from one
stage to the next and the gasses and waste heat from the coke
ovens and blast furnaces could be used elsewhere in the mill. 4
This type of integration had the effect of increasing the size
of the company and allowing the firm to realize desirable eco
nomies of scale.

However t vertically integrating suppliers of

raw materials, that is purchasing raw material deposits t does
increase the size of a steel firm but does not help that firm
realize economies of scale.

Rather, the reason large steel

companies bought up iron ore and coal deposits was to insure
themselves a steady supply of those natural resources.
action did not save the

firm~(

moneYt since they then had to

invest in mines, transportation t and receiving centers.

7

This

What

did transpire t however, was that competition in the steel in

, .(.~!.

dustry was gpae'.r than it would have been if the firms had
not integrated. 5
With the number of potential entrants reduced, mergers·
among steel competitors formed large oligopolistic firms such
as United States Steel.

A group led by J.P. Morgan combined

resources and bought up many big companies t the end product of
previous mergers t creating United States Steel--the largest
corporation evert at that time.

In 1901, USS controlled 44 per

cent of the country's reported steel-ingot capacitYt and 66 per
cent of steel output. 6

These events t occurring in the early

part of this centurYt serve as the foundation for the steel
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industry's market structure.
Not surprisingly, this oligopolistic structure facilitated
collusion rather than aggessive competition.

A pricing policy

developed among the colluding firms, and because United States
Steel was the prime mover behind this cooperative attitude, it
assumed the role of price leader which it maintained for the
first six decades of this century.

Several pricing schemes

were designed to assure that prices remained uniform throughout
the industry.

Perhaps the most famous were the basing-point

pricing method and the multiple basing-point method.

Up until

1924, the basing-point price method was used by the steel in
dustry.

This system allowed each seller to know exactly the

price it was expected to charge for each product at any loca
tion in the country.

Since Pittsburgh was the only basing point,

the delivered price of any product was calculated as if the steel
had been shipped from Pittsburgh, regardless of where it had,
actually 'been shipped.]

While this pricing scheme was effec

tive in achieving complete price predictability in the industry,
it artificially induced steel producers and consumers to locate
in the Pittsburgh area and retarded the industrial development
of the South and the West. 8 In 1924, the basing-point pricing
method was replaced by the multiple basing-point pricing method.
The principle of price uniformity and predictability remained
the same under this new system.

The only difference was that

there were more basing-points in addition to Pittsburgh.

Prices

were quoted in terms of the nearest basing point (Chicago or
Birmingham) plus the transportation cost to the point of delivery.

•
After World War II,

the FTC investigated the multiple basing

point system and forced steel producers to switch to a f.o.b.
(ex-mill) pricing system.

Even under this system, however,

companies are still able to quote their prices based on the lo
cation of other mills and able to absorb the freight costs. 9
Not only were prices very uniform in the steel industry, but
remarkably rigid and unresponsive to competitive market forces.
This price rigidity continued up to World War 11. 10 "From 1947
to the end of the 1950s, the pricing pattern in the steel market
changed to one of greater flexibility but only in an upward
direction." l l

"Stair-st ep " price increases occurred at regular

intervals, even when demand and unit labor costs were declining. 12
Obviously, the steel industry felt the demand for steel was much
more price inelastic than it actually was.

Such an upward pricing

policy also seems to ignore the existence of potential competi
tors who were in Europe and Japan modernizing their mills and
improving the efficiency of their production.
Robert Crandall cites three occurrences as the main reasons
for the U.S. decline in the world steel market:

declining raw

material prices, declining shipping costs, and the diffusion of
new technology.

Reacting to the fears of possible iron ore

shortages, the industry raised ore prices in 1946.

The result

ing high prices encouraged other firms, both here and abroad, to
seek out new iron ore deposits which were found in Canada, Vene
zuela, and Australia.

Thus by raising the price of iron ore,

the steel industry eliminated its own advantage over other coun
tries of owning low-cost convenient supplies of iron ore.
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The cost of iron ore was made worse with the exhaustion of
the high-grade Mesabi Range ore.

Since this range is depleted,

.the U.S. must depend on pellet plants that process lower-grade
taconite ore from the Lake Superior region or on foreign ores.
The costs incurred in processing lower-grade taconite ore are
much greater than those incurred with high-grade ore from the
Mesabi Range.

"The result (therefore), is that inland Amertcan

mills have gone from a position of having special access to low
cost ore to one of depending on higher-cost ore than many of its
foreign competitors have, especially Japan."13

With these new

discoveries the world price of iron ore dropped and U.S. imports
of iron ore increased.
The second factor contributing to the steel industry's
drop in the world market was the decline in world shipping costs.
The cost of shipping iron ore from Brazil to Japan fell by 60
percent from 1957 to 1968. 14 Furthermore, while shipping costs
were declining, U.S. surface transportation costs were rising.
This had significant cost consequences for the majority of U.S.
steel plants, given their inland locations throughout the Midwest
and Northeast. 15 Also, reduced shipping costs, when combined
with declining raw material prices, promoted exports to distant
markets that may have been previously unreachable--a fact that
had an entirely different effect for Japan than for the U.S.
In 1956, iron ore prices were $9.63 per ton for the U.S. and
$16.69 per ton for Japan; however, in 1967 iron ore prices rose
to $11.91 for the U.S. while .declining to $11.49 for Japan. 16
These cost reductions were

an

ob~ious

boost to an emerging steel

•
exporter like Japan.
Not only were declining raw material prices helpful to Japan,
but also the application of new technology helped their exports
compete with more established U.S. firms.

Because its industrial

base was destroyed during World War II, Japan was able to totally
rebuild its steel industry utilizing the most advanced technol
ogy.

This situational factor, combined with Japan's foresight,

helped it surpass the
efficiency.

~ging

American steel plants in output and

Crandall points out specifically the foresight of

the Japanese:
As the Japanese adopted the newest steelmaking tech
nology (the basic oxygen furnace), pioneered in large
blast furnaces, and forged ahead rapidly with contin
uous casting, their labor productivity increased dram
atically. Moreover, the Japanese led the way in ap
plying sophisticated computer control
the pouring,
forming and rolling of steel products.

19

This new technology is directly responsible for the 30 percent
decline, from 1958 to 1968, in Japanese unit labor costs which
occurred as Japanese wages increased by 244 percent (in U.S.
dollars).

During this same period, U.S. wages rose by only 39
percent, and unit labor costs remained constant. 18 To summarize,
for most of the 1960s Japanese material costs, unit labor costs,

and shipping costs declined while U.S. surface transportation
costs increased, and material and unit labor costs remained
practically constant.
This world situation placed serious import pressure on the
American steel industry and forced it to make a key policy de
cision.

The industry could fight the import competition by

becoming technically more efficient, modernizing its plants,
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and reducing its costs; or it could run to the government for
protection.

Choosing the protectionist course, the steel in

dustry pressured the Johnson administration in 1968 to reach an
agreement limiting imports from Europe and Japan.

The "Voluntary

Restraint Agreement" (VRA) was subsequently agreed upon and suc
cessfully reduced imports by 22 percent in 1969 and by an ad
ditional 5 percent in 1970.
Those quotas were in effect from 1969 to 1974 and were in
tended to provide temporary relief to the steel industry while
it invested in new equipment to make itself more competitive. 19
This reinvestment, however, did not occur; in fact, the steel
industry had less capital expenditures in 1974 than in 1968. 20
What did occur was investment diversification among steel firms
in the industry.

Many firms acquired other firms outside the

steel industry and thus became conglomerates.

In 1968, National

Steel became joint owner of the fifth largest primary aluminum
producer.

In 1969 Armco Steel acquired HITCO,'one of the largest

producers of nonmetallic composites.- In 1970, Inland Steel
acquired Scholz Hanes. 21 The philosophy behind conglomeration
is to spread out the investments of the firm, that is purchase
companies in other sectors of the economy, so when one area of
the economy declines the firm can still be supported by one of
its companies in another sector.

The investment decision of a

conglomerate is to strengthen those companies or'plants that
earn the highest rate of return; therefore if a steel plant has
a lower rate of return than a non-steel company that the con
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glomerate owns, the steel plant will not receive reinvestment
funds.

This type of disinvestment is exactly what happened and

continues to happen in the steel industry.
moves of major steel companies into

"Ironically, these

non~steel

activities

coin~

cided with loud protestations by these producers about inade
quate resources to undertake the modernization of the antiquated
plants in order to become cost-competitive by international
standards. 2~
The steel industry not only failed to significantly re
invest in its mills during this time, but it also allowed
wages to rise dramatically.

In 1967, average compensation in

steel was about 38 percent above the average manufacturing in
dustry.

In 1974, steel wages were 60 percent above the manu

facturing average wage, and in 1976 this differential rose to
71 percent.

These high wages can also be attributed to the

powerful United Steel Workers Union, whose demands have not
been known for fighting inflation.

In 1973, the negotiated con

tract provided a wage increase of 3 percent per year for 3 years
plus an escalator clause that reimbursed workers for two-thirds
to three-quarters of the recorded rate of inflation.

With no

productivity growth occurring after 1973, this was a very ex
.
penslve
agreement ..23

These high labor costs, combined with renewed import pres
sures, caused severe hardship for the steel industry in the late
1970s.

Several plants were closed in 1977, and workers were left

unemployed.

Seeking protection, industry and union officials once

again pressured the administration to take action.

The

Carter administration,responded·by implementing the so-called
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"Trigger Price Mechanism" (TPM).

Trigger Prices were based on

constructed Japanese production and transportation costs for
steel shipped to the United States.

Imports that came in from

any country, not just Japan, at prices less than these trigger
prices would result in increased duties.

Essentially these trig
ger prices set a floor on the prices of imported steel. 24 Fur
thermore, the TPM allowed domestic producers to raise their
prices to at least the list price thus eliminating all com
petitive discounts which might have taken place in the ab
sence of trigger pricing.
In conclusion, the difficulties in today's steel industry
are a product of a long history

~f

non-competition.

Its oligo

polistic market structure fostered collusion and cooperation
among firms, causing the industry to be unresponsive to changing
market conditions.

The American steel industry failed to modern

ize its equipment in the 1950s and continued to raise its prices.
As its market position deteriorated and import pressure from the
Japanese apd Europeans increased, many steel firms invested in
non~steel

and the industry sought protection from the government.

Despite the temporary help it received from the government, many
steel plants, particularly in the Midwest and the Northeast, have
closed down and thousands of workers have lost their jobs.

This

widespread unemployment is perhaps the most disturbing aspect
of the steel industry's decline.

Yet what should be done, if

anything, to alter the course of the steel industry and aid its
unemployed?

Confronted with high input prices, especially in the

areas of iron ore and labor, the American steel tndustry is at

~
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cost disadvantage with its world competitors.

Unfortunately,

most American steel mills have no choice but to face a high
price for iron ore, because of the depletion of convenient de
posits in the U.S. and because of their inland location.

High

labor costs, however, are something that can be changed.

If

this input cost disadvantage cannot be overcome, retraining
should be implemented for workers as the industry is phased out.
However, if a way can be found to lower labor costs and improve
productivity enough to offset the cost disavantage of iron ore,
the steel industry's oligopolistic market structure should be
broken and greater competition among firms encouraged.

The

next section evaluates the applicability of employee ownership
to the problems .of high labor costs, low productivity, and em
ployment stability.
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Section II:

Employee Owned Firms and Traditional Firms

When comparing employee owned single plant firms and tradi
tional capitalist firms, it is important to point out their dif
ferent internal structures.

Traditional firms are characterized

by three distinct bodies operating within the firm--the stock
holders, a group of managers, scientists and highly skilled in
dividuals that John Kenneth Galbraith refers to as the techno
structure, and the production workers.

Under this system the

stockholders own the firm but do not control its production or
investment decisions.

In addition, the workers are employed by

the firm, but they do not control the decisions.

Rather, it

is the technostructure that runs the firm and makes its de
cisions.

According to Galbraith, as long as an acceptable

profit is being maintained, the stockholders will, in most
cases, support the desires of the technostructure.

Employee

owned single plant firms, however, integrate these three bodies.
Since the technostructure and the production workers own this
type of firm, they are the stockholders.

Furthermore, the techno

structure is no longer the sole decision-maker, rather the pro
duction workers together with the technostructure make the in
vestment, production, and hiring decisions.

This shift in owner

ship and structure will cause employee owned single plant firms to
behave differently and have different priorities than traditional
firms.
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The problems that beset the steel industry have all occurred
within a traditional capitalistic economic environment.

High pro

duction costs and low rates of return have forced profit maxim
izing conglomerate firms to close down steel plants throughout
the Midwest and the Northeast.

The hardship of unemployment suf

fered by this regional segment of the population from such action
shows a distrubing side to profit maximizing capitalism.

In an

effort to most efficiently use capital, the profit maximizing
firm fails to account for the "social" costs and the spillover
effects of closing a plant.

The resulting unemployment affects

individuals and communities in many ugly ways.
one1s self worth is decreased.

Psychologically

The loss of revenue from a closed

plant can severely affect a community's ability to provide ser
vices.

Furthermore, individual income loss has a negative ef

fect on other businesses in the community.
Unlike a capitalist firm, a cooperative form of

organiza~

tion tends to give a greater weight to stable employment.

Be

cause ownership is spread among local workers these social costs
are taken into account when decisions are made.

This section will

point out the different objective functions for the capitalist
and the cooperative firm, and discuss the implications of these
differences.

Also. it will show how a cooperative can improve

the rate of productivity by increasing worker incentives.

Final

ly, it will discuss the consequences of the trade-off between
regional employment stability and efficient resource allocation.
Since capitalist firms and cooperatives are organized dif
ferently, they have different objective functions.

In symbolic
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notation, Branko Horvat expresses the following target function
for cooperatives:

( 1)

'ft

= Pq -

~ d + f:Jj d }x +

k)

This is opposed to the following target function for a capitalist
firm:

(2)

'ff

= pq - ~VMP}X + k]

These two functions are given under the assumption that we are
dealing with only two resources--capital and labor.
equations

(~)

In both

represents net revenue, (pq) equals gross rev

enue, (x) the number of workers, and (k) depreciation.

In the

first equation, Horvat maintains that cooperatives set some as
pired personal income for the firm or the worker-owners at the
beginning of each year.

Therefore, (d) represents some standard

aspired income based on the previous year, and (Ad) equals the
addition to this aspired income to be achieved in the current year.
In the second equation, the (d +

~d)

term is replaced by the

value marginal product of labor (VMP) which is essentially the
wage rate.
In both equations 1 and 2, labor's and capital's contri
bution is accounted for out of the gross revenue.

Depreciation

or (k) represents the marginal factor cost of capitalvand is

I~vr~

Vi'
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essentially the payment to capital for its contribution.
and (VMP) are the payment to labor or its wage.

(d

+~d)

Thus, before the

profits are distributed, the contributions of both labor and cap
ital are payed out.
This distinction, (d + Od) and (VMP), between the two tar
get functions has an effect on the number of workers employed
by each enterprise.

In the cooperative, (d + Ad) can be seen

as the wage rate just as (VMP) is the wage rate in a conventional
firm.

The total compensation per worker, however, to cooperative

worker-owners is:

'1t

+ (d + bd)x
x

Unlike a capitalist firm, the net revenue in a cooperative ac
crues not to the

own~rs

of capital but to the workers themselves.

One can see how this affects employment in figure II-I, which is
taken from A. A. Brewer's and M. J. Browning's analysis on em
ployment decisions. 25 On the graph line (1) which is the total
labor cost has a slope that represents the- marginal factor
cost of 1abor,- assuming that wages are detell'mined in a
competitive market.

For a cooperative, this represents the wage

one could earn outside the cooperative.

By drawing lines (a)

and (b), having the same slope as line (1), tangent to curves
(d + Ad)x and

~

+ (d + Ad)x respectively, we can see a relation

ship between the number employed and the level of compensation.
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At line (a)' s point of tangency with curve (d +Ad)x. the mar
ginal revenue of labor equals the marginal factor cost of labor.
and the result is an employment level of N1 .
at line (b)' s point of tangency with a curve

The same is true
~

+~d)x

+ (d

which

results in an employment level of N2 . Therefore. because their
workers receive a portion of net revenues. a cooperative is able
to employ greater numbers of workers.

Figure II-I

$

*

'it"" + (d

+~..

d)x

(d + 6d)x*wage bill={VMP)

"----..L--"---------------N

Furthermore. there exists a distinction in maintaining em
ployment between the cooperative and the conventional firm.

When

wages are negotiated with a union. they are often done so for a
period of years at a time.

This wage rigidity. combined with

management's reluctance to alter its own salaries. forces tra
ditional firms to use layoffs as a way of cutting costs during
economic times.

These wage

contstraints~Jhowever.

are not

h~rd

pla~ed
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upon a cooperative.
them to change.

Wages can change as soon as workers allow

Since stable employment is a high priority of

cooperatives, there is a great reluctance to layoff fellow
worker-owners.

If faced with declining demand, the cooperative,

instead of reducing the number of workers, will reduce its as
.

.

plred level of lncome, (d).

26

In addition to maintaining employment, evidence suggests
that cooperatives can increase technical efficiency through""
higher rates of productivity.

Often antagonism between labor

and management occurs in a capitalist firm.

The relationship

between workers and managers tends to be authoritative, with
workers having little, if any, input into how the firm is run.
The democratic structure of a cooperative however breaks down
this labor-management antagonism.

Workers make the operating

decisions and those selected to manage or serve as administrators
are simply viewed as fellow partners who perform different func
tions.

As a worker at the Meriden cooperative plant in Britain

put it, liThe comflradeship was fantastic.

We all felt we were

fighting for an ideal of showing that we could make bikes and
make a profit.

Nowadays, if we have a"problem, it is a com
mon enemy for us all to solve." 27 Increased harmony among the
workers undoubtedly has spillover effects on productivity.

When

I

workers are pleased with their jobs, they are likely to work more
efficiently.
Reducing the wage differential is another way cooperatives
break the tension between labor and management.

This shift in

wages creates a more democratic environment which is conducive to
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higher rates of productivity.

Examples of greater wage equ1iza

tion exist both here and abroad; the Meriden cooperative in Brit
ain, the Mondragon cooperative in Spain, the plywood coopera
tives of our Northeast, and the Vermont Asbestos Group have all
had low salary ratios between the highest and lowest-paid work
ers or managers when compared with capitalist-owned firms. 28
Furthermore, because greater wage equality reduces the compe
tition for promotion, workers are more likely to teach other skills.
However, if wages are made equal for all workers, negative ef
fects are likely to result.

The U.S. plywood cooperatives are the

prime example of equal wages for all workers regardless of the
task they perform.

This action has caused jealousy and i11

feelings among some workers, especially the highly skilled, who
resent the fact that workers with much less experience and exper
tise earn as much as they do. 29 In addition to nurturing jea1
ousy, total wage equalization removes from the enterprise any
monetary incentive system for allocating human resources.
Maintaining a wage differential encourages people to utilize
their best abilities, which, in turn, benefits the enterprise
and society as a whole.

Therefore, it would appear that a co

operative could be most effective when the wage differential is
narrowed but not totally equalled.
~

Aside from reducing the antagonism between labor and manage
ment, and the wage differential, the cooperative's key to higher
rates of productivity is simply allowing workers to have direct
control over the decisions of the firm.

Even "in capitalist firms,

improved job satisfaction through small increases in worker
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participation has increased productivity.

The worker-partici

pation programs in Japan and Germany have undoubtedly contributed
to their high rates of productivity.

One can understand how work

ers might work harder when they know they have input into the de
cision-making process of the firm and are receiving a portion of
its net revenues.

Worker ownership and control actually give

the workers responsibility for the firm's success or failure and
this responsibility provides a strong incentive for workers to
produce a quality product and produce it efficiently.

In a

study done comparing the efficiency of garment workers who were
allowed to discuss and decide upon production with those allowed
to discuss only, L. C. Lawrence and P. C. Smith found that
lithe discussion-and-decision group increased its productivity
to statistically significant levels over is own pre-experiment
al level and over that of the discussion-only group.1I 30
An additional difference between a traditional firm and a
cooperative is that the cooperative trades off some allocative
efficiency for greater employment stability.

Although the invest

ment decisions of traditional conglomerates are consistent with
profit maximizing behavior, they literally hasten the death of
steel plants with a low rate of return.

Taking a portion of the

profits from one plant with a low rate of return ,and reinvesting
those funds' into a plant with a high rate .of:return places a tre
mendous cost, both economic and social, on the workers of that low
return plant and the community surrounding·it.

Often it is

assumed that movement among jobs and geographic locations will

•
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compensate for labor market changes.

This assumption, however,

tends to be false in the short-run.

While the younger, skilled,

and geographically less committed workers may be able to move;
the older, less skilled workers are less likely to

re1ocate.es~

pecia11y when they have stakes in the community such as money
tied up in their homes, relatives, or long-term social re1ation
ships.31

Under a cooperative, capital would be tied much more

to groups of people in certain geographic locations.

It is a

form of ownership and a structure that meets the needs of a re
gional population rather than a structure that forces that pop
ulation to adjust to it.
Essent~ly,

ities.

cooperatives involve a re-ordering of prior

In a traditional firm profit-maximization is the key

objective, but in a cooperative, this is not the case.

Main

taining employment stability while providing a decent standard
of living to its workers is the goal of a cooperative.

This

goal, however, does result in a cost--the loss of some a110cative
efficiency in the short-term.

More stable regional employment is

achieved at the expense of greater capital availability in higher
growth areas.

Yet something should be done to ease the burden

placed on low rate of return communities.

Worker ownership

has its strength in maintaining employment and keeping workers
productive.

As former vice-president Walter Monda1e states,

It's time to focus on an element missing in the American
right of workers, their families and the com
munities in which they live to some sort of decent treat
ment and concern when a company is planning or considering
the possibility of c10sing.32
economy-~he

•
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Section III:

Problems Faced in Establishing an Employee
Owned Firm

Employee ownership is a viable option to a community con
cerned about the unemployment created by a closing plant.

In

fact, employee ownership is often the last hope for communities
to maintain economic activity.

Although workers may have the

incentive to purchase the closing plant, actually achieving
this goal is a task that requires a great deal of coordination
and is not without difficulties.

This section discusses some

of the problems that are often found in the process of estab
lishing an employee owned enterprise.

The first problem is

the inadequate advance warning corporations give to their workers
when they have decided to shut down a plant. Second, corporations
are often reluctant to sell the plant to the employees for
various reasons.

The third and most important problem is ob

taining enough financial capital to purchase the plant.
problem will require leaders and feasibility studies.

This.
Further

more, it may mean issuing common stock and soliciting govern
ment loans. The final problem discussed is the proper role for
the union in an employee owned firm.
~hen

a company decides to close a plant, it tends to give

very little warning to the workers.

The Lykes corporation gave

no advance warning when it shut down the Campbell Works portion.
33
of tts·YoUngstown' Sheet and ITube facilities.
The Sperry
Rand corporation, however, announced its intention to close the
Library Bureau, a maker of library furniture, with the nebulous
phrase, "within twelve months."

34

The implications of such short
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notice, usually a matter of months, is that workers are put under
pressure and must work very fast to find leaders, organize them
selves, and obtain financial capital.

It should be noted that

the workers at the Weirton steel plant, who in March of this year
reached an agreement to purchase the plant, were not subjected
to this late warning problem.

National Steel, the conglomerate

owner, announced a full year in advance its intention to stop
investing in the Weirton plant. 35 This twelve month period gave
workers and community leaders time to devise a purchase plan
that seems to have worked.

Thus, the severity of this "warning"

problem seems to depend on the attitude of the owning corporation
toward the possibility of worker ownership.
Another problem frequently encountered is the current
unwillingness to sell the plant.

owner~s

Management may feel that they

can make more money selling the equipment and writing off the
buildings.

In these cases, workers have often secured local

congresspersons to apply pressure on company officials, in or
der to get them to negotiate.

In other cases, management may be

reluctant to sell because of the possibility of competition from
its former plant.

36

Occasionally a company will initially re

fuse to negotiate a sale only to change its mind when it sees
that the workers are serious about buying the plant and are
raising the necessary funds.

This was the case with the Library

Bureau. Sperry Rand refused to negotiate, but then later, reacting
to public pressure and community mobilization, changed its mind and
negotiated.
The third problem is perhaps the most difficult problem in
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establishing an employee owned enterprise: financing the purchase
of the plant.

This problem can be made less severe, however, if

three roles are filled.
1)

A chief executive officer (CEO) capable of providing
managerial leadership in production and marketing.

2)

A financial expert capable of analyzing financial
needs and dealing with sources of funds.

3)

An organizer able to link together workers, manage
ment people, community leaders, politicians, govern
ment officials, and the press in an at least tempo
rary coalition to launch the project. 37

The prime task of these three individuals will be to raise enough
capital to buy the plant.

The prospective managerial leader

must have the confidence of bankers and community members in
order for the employee enterprise to secure loans and issue
stock.

Often this person emerges as one of the key managers in

the closing plant.

While this person would have intimate know

ledge of the plant, s/he must also be willing to adjust to the
new form of ownership and must be trusted by the workers
selves.

them~

If an executive does not step forth from the closing'

plant, a more complicated problem can develop.

"(Any) prospective

CEO is unlikely to consider the position seriously unless he sees
that the problems of financing the purchase and providing oper
ating capital have been solved.

At the same time, those in

dividuals and organizations counted on for equity or loan capital
are not inclined to commit their money until they are persuaded
that a competent CEO has accepted the challenge offered him." 38
Unfortunately, such a dilemma can only be worked out through the
circumstances of each individual case.
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The organizer role should be filled by someone who knows
the community and can take charge of a money-raising campaign.
This person must find creative ways to get community financial
support, i.e. telethons, door-to-door soliciting, or community
club fund drives.

More importantly, however, the organizer

must bring together competing factions within the plant, and
must work with the financial expert in obtaining the interest
·
an d coopera t lon

0 f.

. agencles
.
. 1
pu bl lC
an d banks. 39 Th e f·lnanCla

expert, in turn, must know where money is available and how to
get it.

This person must also know how to work within the local,

state, and federal governments.

Together with the organizer,

the financial expert needs to discover the best way to approach
the issue of issuing bonds to the community and acquiring do
nations.

Generally, people will contribute to a plant's pur

chase once they see how the economic viability of the community
is related to the ecnnomic viability of the closing plant. The
organizers of the Library Bureau purchase, for example, raised
over 2.6 millionfr.om the surrounding community.40
Aside from soliciting bonds and donations, obtaining loans
from banks and government agencies will be
ficulty.

anoth~r

financing dif

First, a feasibility study needs to be commissioned in

order to purchase the plant and gage its profit potential.

In

1977 at Youngstown, Ohio, a Philadelphia engineering firm and the
Western Reserve Economic Development Agency (WREDA) conducted a
study to determine the feasibility of acquiring and operating
the closed portion of the Campbell Works steel facility.41
study concluded that "the purchase and modernization of the

The
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Campbell Works would require a capital investment of about $500
mi11ion.

1I

42 Writing on Youngstown's steel mill closings,

St~ughton

Lynd goes on to state, IIWe could not reopen any of these monster
mills {in the Mahoning Valley of Ohio} without amounts of capital
that only the government could provide ...

11

43 These large sums

of money, however, are difficult to raise with no advance warning
of the shutdowns, as was previously discussed.

The leaders at

Youngstown were only able to secure $100 million in federal loan
guarantees from the EDA and $10 million in state assistance. 44
It is not clear, however, whether government loans are
necessary for all employee purchase initiatives.

The employees

who are purchasing the Weirton steel plant have not received
any government grant or loans.

"A price of $66 million was

set for the mill and the equipment by bargainers on a Joint Study
Committee~

including representatives of theemp1byee ' s union,

the independent steelworkers, and the Weirton Division and
National Steel Corporation.

1I

45 This

pri~~

th~

represents 22 percent

{sic} of the $322 million book value that National Steel has
placed on the plant.

Many steel assets, however, have been sel

ling for far less than book value, given the depressed state of
the industry.

The new employee owned company is also scheduled

to purchase, for $300 million, raw materials and other inventory
from National Steel. 46
Under the Weirton purchase plan, only a $100-$150 million in
immediate financial backing is being required; furthermore, the
$66 million would be paid out over 15 years.
on the principal would be due in 1989.

The first payment

No interest would be
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paid until the new company had a net worth of $100 million.
The interest rate after that would be 10 percent." 47 As for
the $300 million that would be paid for inventory, $75 million
of that $300 million would be paid in cash immediately and the
rest over as much as 28 years.

The terms of this deal are ex

cellent; National Steel also agreed to assume all pension costs
and other shutdown costs if the new company failed in the first
five yea~.48 The Weirton Works is relatively modern and has a
good reputation for producing a quality product; therfore,

its

chances of obtaining sufficient financial capital may be better
than for a more antiquated plant.

Yet the experience at Weirton

indicates that massive amounts of support from the government
may not always be required when employees purchase a closing
steel mill.
A final problem in establishing an employee owned firm is
deciding how the union will fit into the new enterprise.

Union

leaders traditionally have been hostile to the idea of employee
ownership, no doubt out of fear for their own survival.

Yet

as union officials have seen employee ownership effectively
save jobs and still retain local union representation, their
hostility has subsided.

Speaking about employee stock ownership

plans (ESOP) in 1981, James Smith, Assistant to the President
of the United Steelworkers of America, states their concerns:
.... 1 certainly wouldn't fear for the future of U.S.W.A.
if every employer in the United States became an ESOP
company. However, there are some minimal conditions
of ESOPs that unions will demand, 1 believe. TheY in
clude the following:
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1)

That employee stock ownership only occur in
addition to an adequate (sic) funded pensTOn
plan. In other words, if employees buy stock
they should do so out of current earnings while
they are active workers, rather than as a sub
stitute for insured retirement income.

2)

That full pass-through of voting rights be
made to every employee on an equitable basis,
with no subterfuge or managerial manipulation
such as occured at South Bend Lathe (a com
pany which will be discussed in the next
section) or most other small ESOPs.

3)

That the stock issued to e~ployees also'be
marketed publicly, so that there can be some
outside judgement of its worth as an invest
ment. In cases where this is impossible there
should be a periodic outside appraisal by a
firm jointly picked by representatives of work
ers and manager. 49

These statements by Smith are interesting because they in
dicate a willingness on the part of the U.S.W.A. to work with
such employee ownership plans. Yet, unions are still very ap
p~~b~nsive about~total

worker

o~nership

and control.

In point

number three, Smith advocates marketing stock publicly.

While

this may indeed be a way of judging the worthiness of the in
vestments, it also takes some control of the enterprise away from
the workers.

If a union is to successfully work within an em

ployee owned firm, it must recognize that its role is different
under employee ownership.

The union must discard its past role

of antagonist and instead encourage mutual cooperation, realizing
that everyone,

in~luding

management, is a worker-owner.

This

shift in attitude, however, does not seem likely to occur in a
union such as the U.S.W.A.

While the U.S.W.A. may understand
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employee stock ownership plans and may be less hostile to their
application, it has given no indication that it is willing to
adjust its role under employee ownership.

The union's long

history as the adversary of management is difficult to alter
simply by converting a plant to employee ownership.

Therfore,

the inclusion of a union in a worker owned firm is still un
clear.

If a union is included it must fully understand its

new role and practice it diligently.

Yet the

likelihoo~

of a

large union such as the U.S.W.A. making such a change remains
doubtful at this time.
In conclusion, the greatest problem workers will face in
saving a plant through a plan of worker ownership will be raising
financial capital.

This task is made more difficult by the

lack of advance warning corporations give'when closing a plant or
by the reluctance some corporations have to sell the plant to
the employees once the decision to shut it down has been made.
This financing problem, however, can be made easier if a com
munity organizer, a financial expert, and a trusted managerial
leader can be found and utilized. _These individuals will prob
ably obtain funds by Issuing bonds, or through loans from banks
and government agencies, depending on the terms of the purchase
agreement.

And finally, the problem of a union in an employee

owned firm will most likely be decided by the union's willing
ness to alter its role to fit the new enterprise.
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Section IV:

Different Cooperative Structures

Up to this point, we have traced the problems of the steel
industry, examining the origins of its oligopolistic market
structure, its high labor costs, and its lack of investment.
We have looked at the,differences between :worker owned enterpris
es and conventional capitalist firms.

Also, we have discussed

some of the problems in establishing a worker owned enterprise,
such as financing the purchase and the union's position in the
new firm.

This section examines the organizational structure

of a cooperative firm and sets down some necessary guidelines
for democratically managing a worker owned firm.

Two different

examples--the U.S. Plywood cooperatives, and the South Bend Lathe
Comapny--are evaluated.

After reviewing the advantages and dis

advantages of each structure, a clearer picture emerges of just
what is and what is not desirable in.a worker owned fffm:.
In Workplace Democratization, Paul Bernstein indicates six'
components necessary for the maintenance of democratization with
in a firm:
1)

Participation in decision-making, whether direct or
elected representation.

2)

Frequent feedback of economic results to all em
ployees (in the form of money, not just information).

3)

Full sharing with employees of management-level in
formation and, to an increasing extent, management
level expertise.

4)

Guaranteed individual rights (corresponding to the
basic political liberties).

5)

An independent board of appeal in case of disputes
(composed of peers as far as possible}.

I
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6)

A particular set of attitudes and values (type of
consciousness). 50

These six components are vital factors of any organizational form
that could be referred to as "cooperative" in nature.

As was

mentioned earl ier, ·the terms "cooperative, "worker owned firm,"
or "employee owned firm" all describe an enterprise in which the
workers own the stock and control the decision-making process.
Stock ownership, however, can be distributed in different ways.
It may be spread among the workers by giving each worker one
share or an equal number of shares.

It may be that the stock

shares are allocated to workers based on their salary or their
years of service.

Under a different structure, a trust fund may

be established through which workers are given stock shares;
this is commonly known as an employee stock ownership trust (ESOT).
Regardless of how the stock shares are distributed, the dis
tance between labor and management is reduced in a

cooperative~

Decisions are no longer made by the owners of capital but by
the owner-workers.

Thus, a cooperative takes Bernstein's first

component to its extreme.

Workers do not just participate in de

cisions, rather they control the decision-making process. The
third component is also very important in a cooperative.

Since

those selected to manage are directly responsible to the workers,
financial and other information must be shared regularly- with
them.

A "cooperative" attitude, component six, is also vital to

a worker owned firm since it often inspires workers to participate
in decision making.

Equ~lly

important are components two, four
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and fivejall of which make good common sense in any business or
ganization.
The first example to be evaluated is taken from the

u.s.

wood industry which has a rich tradition of cooperatives.

ply

Since

the founding of the first one in 1921, the number of cooperatives
in this industry has risen to twenty-six; today, however, only
eighteen firms continue to operate. 51 The·decision-making struc
ture varies from co-op to co-op but the basic principles are the
same.

Each worker owns one share and casts one vote in company

wide elections.

All the employee shareholders meet annually to

elect from their membership a board of directors, usually seven
to nine people.

This board makes the policy decisions for the

firm, but has its power checked by the whole body of workers in
a number of ways.

Expenditures over $25,000 as well as any

major investment or expansion decision must be approved by the
entire membership.

Furthermore, in some companies, the workers

can challenge a decision of the directors by obtaining the sig
natures

of

10 to 20 percent of the membership on a petition and

calling for a special meeting.
decision~,-the

In addition to making policy

board"of directors· appoints a general manager,

usually someone from outside the firm, who is responsible for the
day-to-day operations of the business. 52 This position of general
manager is vital to the cooperative, and the person selected must
have an astute business sense as well as the political skills to
deal with a large number of worker-owners.

Although the general

manager directs the workers on a day-to-day basis, this person
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must ultimately answer to the workers, since they set his salary
and control his employemnt.
The members of the board of directors are also directly ac
countable to their fellow workers.

Those elected to serve on

the board of directors receive no special pay and continue to
work in the plant while serving on the board.

The fact that

directors still work in the plant conveniently allows other
workers to make complaints

dir~ctly

to them during working hours.

Furthermore, if the workers do not like what a particular board.
member is doing or how that person is acting, they can simply
not reelect that person.
This internal structure of the plywood cooperatives has some
advantages.

First of all, workers do in fact own the firm and

control its decisions. A general manager is appointed, but be
cause of the size of the firm, s/he cannot ignore or dismiss the
desires of the workers.

Second, because those members on the

board of directors tend to come from different areas of opera
tions within the plant and because the plant is very small, making
it possible for them to work alongside other workers, they re
ceive a fairly accurate picture of the company and the concerns
of the workers.

Furthermore, the informal discussions workers

and directors have on the job truly influence the board's de
cisions.
The result of this type of ownership and internal organizational
structure has meant high rates of productivity in these plywood
firms.

When workers realize that they are responsible for the
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company's success and that they have a direct influence on pol
icy decisions and that they are receiving a share of the firm's
profit, they tend, not surprisingly, to be more productive.

"A

study in the 1960s, according to researcher Katrina Berman, showed
the worker-owned firms produce 30 percent more per worker than
traditional firms.

Even the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, in

a tax case against the plywood cooperatives, essentially

con~

firmed cooperative data showing the co-ops are 25-60 percent
more productive than conventional mills." 53 This high product
ivity level allows these cooperatives to pay their members con
siderably more than the average conventional unionized plants.
Often this is 20 percent more per hour, which is added on to
the workers' share of the income the cooperative expects to
have earned by the end of the year. 54
Aside from these advantages, the plywood cooperatives are
still plagued with problems.

Often many workers fail to see

the necessity to invest for the long-term; they seem far more
concerned with taking home as much money as possible. 55 This
short-sighted attitude places difficult constraints on the gen
eral manager who is often fighting for greater investment.

An

other problem irising is that the manager's responsibility to act
on the desires of the membership tends to make him more conserva
tive and less likely to take calculated risks.

This managerial

position in turn, could severely hinder the firm's technological
innovation. 56 Still another problem occurs with expanding the
membership.

The workers- each own one share of stock which has

increased in value over time as the cooperative has grown and
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matured.

As the enterprise expands, the membership could be ex

panded by issuing new shares, but workers are reluctant to do
this for fear that the value of their own shares would decline.
The value of the shares, however, does not necessarily decrease
because more are issued.

Only if the number of new shared is

sued is increasing more than the market value of the firm will
the value of the shares decline.
Restricting membership out of the fear of declining stock
value is referred to by self-management researchers as "co l
lective selfishness." 57 A result of this "se lfish" behavior is
an old and closed membership and/or the introduction of non
owner workers.

Unfortunately, including these non-owner hourly

workers in the cooperative brings in worker attitudes much too
similar to those in a conventional firm.

These workers earn

about 50 cents per hour less than the co-op members, receive no
share of the profits, cast no votes, and usually get assigned
to the worst jobs. 58 The very presence of these workers acts
counter to fostering a cooperative spirit among workers and is
likely to present a serious drag on the cooperatives level of
productivity.

A final problem with the plywood cooperatives

is that of continuity.

As the cooperative members practice col

lective selfishness and continue to raise their level of productI

ivity, the value of their shares increase.

Thus, the old members

have a strong incentive to sell their shares at a handsome profit
to conventially owned firms that are capable of paying the market
value of their shares.

The~result

of this action .is that the work

ers leave with a good sum of money but the cooperative dies out.
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This is exactly what happened to half of the eight plywood co
operatives that went out of business between 1921 and the
present. 59 Because these cooperatives were so successful, their
shares increased tremendously in value.

The high price per

share made it impossible for other workers to buy into the co
operative; hence, large corporations seeing a potential profit
making opportunity and possessing the financial resources to
purchase the shares, bought out the cooperatives and returned them
to conventional ownership.
A second example of worker ownership is exhibited by the
South Bend Lathe company.

After Amsted Industries announced it

was going to close the plant, the president of the plant, and
plant managers, met with local union officials, city bankers,
and government officials to piece together an Employee Stock
Ownership Plan that would enable the workers and salaried man
agers to buy the pl ant. 60 The pl an worked as follows:
-The Economic Development Agency gave $5 million grant
to the city of South Bend which immediately lent the
money to a newly created employee trust fund.
-The employee trust also borrowed another $5 million
from three commercial financial institutions.
-Meanwhile, the managers and employees created a new
corporate entity, which issued 10,000 shares of stock;
with the $10 million in cash~·fhe employee trust bought
the stock; in turn, the new corporate entity paid the $10 61
million to Amstead Industries and bought South Bend Lathe.
Under this.new plan, the company will put a portion of the annual
profits into the employee trust which will be used to payoff the
company's long-term loans.

Furthermore, the profits de

posited in the"trust are tax-deductable-a major reason why ESOPs
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are implemented.

As the company's loans are paid off, employees

receive a certain number of stock shares based on how long they
have worked in the company and how much money they earn. 62
After the workers took over ownership, the company's financial
picture improved.

The University of Michigan Institute for Social

Research reported the pre-tax profits for

t~e

first year of work

er ownership were 20 percent on invested capital.

"The research

ers also reported--based on data collected 18 months after the
workers had bought the factory--that productivity appears also
to have increased since the change in ownership, while quality
has also improved."63

As time went by, however, workers real

ized that ownership is not the same as control.

They began to

complain about not being consulted on major investment decisions,
or about being treated poorly by managers.

One worker sums it

up by saying, "When you get down to the real meat of it, there
really isn't much difference (than how it was in the past.)11 64
There is also the problem of equality in compensation.

Because

profit bonuses are distributed according to salary, managers,
with higher salaries, get much larger bonuses.

South Bend Lathe

is a prime example of ownership without control . . IIWhen the ESOP
is designed exclusively by management (as in this case), it is
possible to structure the trust agreement in such ways as to
keep legal control in the hands of management indefinitely, in
which case opportunities for workers' participation will depend
upon what management concedes voluntarily or under union pres
65
sure·~11

After examining the plywood cooperatives and South Bend Lathe's
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structure, the attributes and deficiencies of both programs be
come clear.

In terms of Bernstein's democratic guidelines, the

plywood cooperatives have done pretty well.
trol over the decisions of the firm.

Workers have con

They are receiving monetary

feedback in the form of equal wages and stock ownership.

Also,

management-level information is being regularly shared with the
workers.

The equal wage structure and the willingness of workers

to serve on the board of directors without extra pay indicates
a devotion to the cooperative and its principles.

This exper

ience is quite different from the one at South Bend Lathe com
pany.

There, workers are not controlling the decision-making

process or even participating in it.

Workers, however, are re

ceiving feedback in the form of money, but these bonuses are not
distributed equally.

In addition, information is not shared with

the employees, and the attitude of the workers is one of dis
trust and dismay.
Yet cooperatives cannot be judged strictly on their ad
herence to principles of democratization.

The plywood cooper

atives pay all workers the same wage regardless of the task be
ing performed.

This action, however, causes strife between the

higher skilled and the lower-skilled workers and removes the mon
etary incentive for workers to develop their skills and make the
best use of their abilities.

The wages at South Bend Lathe, on

the other hand, were not equal and compensation from the ESOP
trust fund was partially based on how much one earned.

The prob

lem here is that the wage differential between management and·
shop floor workers did not change when the company changed to
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employee ownership; in fact, the differential was increased because
of the earnings distribution from the ESOP trust fund.
In section II, I asserted that cooperatives would operate
more effectively when the wage differential is less than a com
parable conventional firm

butnot:tot~lly

equaled.

In light of

the experiences of the plywood cooperatives and the South Bend
Lathe company, a reduced wage differential would seem most de
sirable.
The continuity problem of the plywood cooperatives brings up
a final point that could be detrimental to the long-run applica
bility of worker owned firms.

If the very success of a coopera

tive means that it will attract financially rich conventional
firms which will want to purchase the enterprise, what will stop
the shareholder-workers from selling their shares at a profit?
In terms of economics, nothing, but non-economically, the pleasure
they get from owning the cooperative or working in an environ
ment which they control are factors that would weigh against the
decision to sell.

Yet because these non-economic factors are

difficult to measure, it is not clear how much of an effect they
will have in sustaining the cooperative.

Since eighteen ply

wood cooperatives have survived over time, these non-economic
factors have made an impact on the decision to change ownership.
Given our current economic environment, however, it is likely that
financial gain will weigh more heavily in the decision to sell,
Thus, cooperatives seem to be most relevant and effective in the
short-term.
The next section, using the experiences from the two examples
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in this section, applies worker ownership to a steel plant.

It

presents a possible cooperative model that can be used as a
short-term solution for reducing the costs to workers of our
economy tranferring resources from steel to more high growth
industries.

When worker ownership is applied to a steel plant,

a new set of problems arise and demand attention.
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Section V:

An Internal Organizational Model for a
Steel Plant

The two examples of employee ownership presented in the last
section were taken from labor-intensive enterprises.

Applying

worker ownership to a capital-intensive steel plant, however,
makes the ownership issue more complicated and less clear.

Be

cause so few, if any, examples exist of capital-intensive cooper
atives in the United States, there is not solid organizational
structure to serve as the basis for a worker owned steel plant
model.

In this section, I put forth such a model to point out

the benfits as well as the unanswered questions of applying em
ployee ownership to a steel plant.

My intent is to provide a

worker ownership model that adheres to the principles of work
place democratization while being as economically efficient as
possible.

Furthermore, the model is to be viewed as a short

run proposal designed to ease the costs placed on the workers
from resource allocation out of the steel industry.

More spe

cifically, the section begins by discussing worker ownership's
effect on the high labor cost and the productivity problem con
fronting steel plants.

Next, the model's highly worker controlled

organizational structure is presented in detail, and this is
followed by a discussion of worker ownership's effect on steel
plant reinvestment.
Two important factors contributing to the American steel in
dustry's lack of ability to compete in the world market are low
productivity and high labor costs.

The severity of these prob
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lems can be clearly seen when we compare the experience of the
United States to that of Japan.

IIIn 1958 we used 18.06 man hours

per metric ton of steel and they were using 61.70.

By 1976

we were using 11.82 man-hours and they were using 10.04.

(Fur

thermore), our unit labor cost was $98.65 against $122.18 in Japan
in 1958, but in 1976 ours was $294.65 and theirs was $161.93.

11
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These statistics will be very difficult to overcome, yet for the
well-being of.thousands of steelworkers, something should be
done.

Since an industry is made up of individual firms, it

is at this plant level that higher rates of productivity and
lower wage costs must begin to appear.

Reporting on the Weirton

issue, Newsweek sheds some light on the issue of wage cuts: IIA1
though the workers were unwilling to accept pay reductions to en
rich National's shareholders, there was a chance that they would
rna ke con ce s s ion s to a com pany the y the ms e1ve sow ned. II 670 nce the
employees agreed to purchase the plant, they accepted a 32 percent
cut in pay.

This action at Weirton confirms what seems logically

c1ear: w0 r ke r s are more 1ike 1y to. acce pt 1owe r wag e s when the y
own and control the firm.
Combating low rates of product)vity is also something
worker owned firms have done quite well in'the past.
of unity and open communication in

a relatively

Feelings

small labor-in

tensive company, howeyer are much more easily achieved than in a
huge capital-intensive steel plant . . In order to achieve higher
rates of productivity and gains in overall plant efficiency,
an employee owned steel

pl~nt'must

emphasize worker rep

resentation at all levels throughout the

pl~nt

tice and encourage intra-firm communications.

and must prac
These concerns were
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paramount when designing the following steel plant organizational
model.

Using figure V-I as a guide, we are able to trace the com

ponents of this proposed structure.
One of the key points to the model is the establishment of
an employee stock ownership trust (ESOT).

This trust fund

borrows money from banks and government agencies, such as the
Economic Development Administration, and then loans the bor
rowed money to the newly created corporate entity for a block
of its common stock.

The company pays back the loan by distri

buting a portion of its profits to the employee trust.

These

profits paid into the trust are tax deductible and thus provide
the company with a healthy tax break.

As the loan is paid off,

the stock held by the trust is equally allocated back to the
accounts of individual employees.

Thus

t

over time employees

build up shares and equity in the firm which will not be taxed
as income until they cash in their shares upon leaving the com
pany.

Furthermore

t

as profits accumulate, dividends are paid

out to workers on these company securities.
Financing the company through an ESOT fund has several
advantages.

The tax break on the profits contributed to the

employee trust is the prime reason for. an ESOT, but beyond that
the trust providesamechanfsm "for distributing ownership among
the workers.

By allocating shares equally, the problems that

occured at South Bend Lathe can be avoided.

There the shares

were distributed according to years of service and how much
money one earned.

This distribution merely fostered strife be

tween the production workers and the higher paid managers, a

Figure V-Ia

ESOT

Board of
Directors
9

I

Personnel
~Union Pres.
(or a worker
appointment
of the board)

Executive
\ -CEO

I

I

Financial
-CFO

I

I

I

prOductiVlty
I
\ -Plant ManaCierl
/

II'

President
l....---r--_..J. -

I

I

I

Production Department Leven
-froductivity Councils

aThe committee level of this organizational chart and the functions of
those committees are based on an organizational chart from Timothy
Jochim's Employee Stock Ownership and Related Plans, Westport, Connec
ticut: Quorum Books, 1982.
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situation which can lower the productivity of a cooperative en
terprise.

Through the issuance of stock shares, the workers

now have a vested interest in the success of the entire firm,
and they are receiving monetary feedback in the form of divi
dends.

Furthermore, this equal distribution of shares is more in

line with the principles of workplace democratization and al
lows for a better working environment.

Employee stock owner

ship plans, however, are not without criticism.

A common com

plaint of ESOTs is that they replace worker pension plans, since
the company cannot afford both plans.

Thus, the worker's retire

ment becomes totally dependent on the success of the firm, which
makes the worker's future very uncertain.

Some companies have

been able to maintain a low funded pension plan along with an
ESOT, but this depends on the financial resources the new enter
prise possesses.
While the ESOT is the workers' mechanism of ownership,
the workers exercise their influence on the company by electing
representatives to the board of directors.

This board consists of

four worker representatives (one being the Personnel Committee
chairperson), the chief executive officer, the chief financial
officer, one of the plant managers and the president who serves
as the chairperson.

Other organizational structures have included

community stockholder representatives on the board of directors.
This, however, depending on the ratio of representatives on the
board, tends to remove a significant degree of control from the
workers.

The cooperative, however, can indirectly include the

immediate community's interest in the enterprise by issuing bonds
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to them.

These bonds should be targeted at those people who

have a similar vested interest in the success of the plant as
the workers themselves, such as local business persons whose
economic stability is tied up with the economic stability of the
mill.

Although local community members do not have ownership

in the plant, they are able to indirectly influence it with their
money.

This represents one option of involving the affected com

munity in the future of the plant without taking

a~ay

some own

ership or control from the workers.
In terms of decision-making the general population workers
have special control over certain decisions, since they are
directly affected by and dependent on the firm.

Decisions of

fundamental change, such as shutdown, layoffs, of plant ex
pansion, must be approved by 80 percent of the entire body of
workers before any action can take place. 68· This procedure
guards against a major action occurring against the majority
of the worker-owners' wishes, and reinforces the workers' con
trol of the enterprise.

Aside from those major decisions,tbe

board is in charge of making general company policy.

One of

its most important tasks is to establish the working wage and a
scale of wage differentials among the employees.

This pay scale

is a delicate subject because one does not want to destroy the
feelings of cooperation between the managers and the produc
tion workers by setting a large pay differential, yet greqter
compensation should be awarded to workers with greater respQn
sibility and more skills.

The desired wage differential, there

fore, is one that would not create strife between wQrkers qnd
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would still monetarily encourage workers to best utilize their
skills and abilities.

This is essentially a political decision and

should be decided by a vote of all the workers.
Another task of the board of directors, moving down the
organizational chart, is to hire the management team, con
sisting of the plant manager, a chief financial officer, a chief
executive officer, and a president.

It is important that these

individuals understand the intent of employee ownership and how
it varies from a traditional firm.

Furthermore, they must be open

and responsive to the conerns and suggestions of the workers.

In

addition, it is vital that these managers develop the trust of
the production workers, since smooth relationships between
these groups fosters better productivity and a better working
environment.

While the board does hire the management team and

set the wage differentials, the workers still retain the right to
appeal any of the board's decisions.

Similar to the plywood

cooperatives, the workers get 10 to 20 percent of the membership
to sign a petition before any decision can be stopped or re
evaluated. 69 This "right to appeal" clause helps the worker
representatives to be more sensitive to their constituency's
needs and concerns.

Also. the 10 to 20 percent requirement in

sures that a sizable portion of the membership responds strongly
against that particular decision, not just a few individuals, be
fore any action is taken.
Up to this point, the role of a union in this model has
not been addressed.

As mentioned "in Section III, the inclusion

of a union in a worker owned firm requires the union to change
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from its traditional role to one that is conducive with a
worker owned enterprise.

Union officials must remember that

while they may be worker representatives, they are expected
to work with fellow owner-manager representatives in an attitude
of cooperation, not confrontation. This attitude is important
because wages are no longer arrived at by hostile owners and
laborers fighting over a bargaining table for their own sep
arate group.

Workers and owners are now one group and decide

upon the wage that will best serve the interest of the total
membership.

Currently, however, such a change in national or

local union policy does not appear likely, especially from the
U.S.W.A.

Thus, it seems that only a company union or a separate

local union would be able to adapt to the cooperative role.
These unions are soley

represent~tives

for the employees of one

firm; therefore, they are capable of changing with the desires of
their membership.

Interestingly, the union involved with the em

ployee purchase of the Weirton steel plant is a company union.
If a company union or a separate local union represents all
the non-managerial workers, then the union president is given a
specific position within this employee ownership model.
under the board of directors (see Figure

V~Ia)

Directly

are

four committees: the personnel, the executive, the financial,
and the productivity committee.

The union president is

chai~person

of the personnel committee, which is composed of one employee
from each department.

This committee1s function is to be another

voice for the workers and foster good industrial relations
within the plant.

Also, it serves as a board of appeal or
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grievance committee where workers can have their disputes aired
and resolved. If no union exists within the plant, then the
chairperson of this committee is appointed by the board of directors.
As for the other committees, the executive committee is
chaired by the chief executive officer, and the finance committee
is chaired by the chief financial officer.

These two committees

are generally filled with highly skilled management people who
are responsible for running the company.
on both committees, as do the plant

The president serves

manager~,

the directors of

marketing, and the director of the legal and research sections. 70
The fourth committee is the productivity committee which is
chaired by one of the plant managers.

Along with this committee,

each department has its own productivity council whose membership
is determined by the department employees.

From the members, the

president of the company picks an employee coordinator for the
council who also serves as the department supervisor and as a
71
member of the productivity commitee.
These department pro
ductivity

co~ncils

tivity bonus plans.

are also in charge of administering produc
These productivity plans will monetarily re

ward workers on a regular basis for being more productive, thus
encouraging workers to find ways of doing their jobs better, which
results in a bright future for the firm.

Although these pro

ductivity bonus plans alter the workers' compensation, they do
not subvert the benefits of a reduced wage differential.

Every

one starts with an equal wage, but those that take more initiative
and are more productive are justly rewarded.

If this system is

explained to workers from the outset and productivity information
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is openly shared among departments the chances of problems de
veloping will be reduced.
In addition to productivity bonus plans, other methods
are used to make worker-owners more concerned about their jobs
and their firm.

Educating workers on the meaning and respon

sibilities of employee ownership is very

impor~ant.

Workers

must realize that they are expected to make decisions, challenge
decisions, and give input into decisions.

As in a political

democracy, the workers must also be aware of how the system
operates in order for that system to be successful.

Thus, when

the new firm opens, groups, similar to Japan's quality control
circles, or Germany's works councils could be established to
orient workers to their new roles as worker-entrepreneurs in
a democratically managed firm.

These groups would also provide

a forum for continued monthly discussions on employee ownership,
the wage differential, or structural problems within the firm.
Another incentive program compensates workers for their loyalty
and willingness to take risks.

Through a stock bonus plan workers

are given extra shares of stock after five years of service;
therefore, workers have the incentive to stay with the company
through good times and bad.

An additional program is designed to

shorten the distance between top level managers and production
workers .

This 'Jl,So g r. am r equi rest he pr. esid e nt lind the chief executive

officer to spend one day· per'mOhth working at the productionilevel,
t~lking

with workers, and learning about their jobs.

An action

such as this helps remind all the employees--the workers, the
managers, and the clerical people--that everyone is on the same
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team.

A united spirit among the worker-owners can only result in

a better working and a more productive environment.
This proposed model, therefore, gives ownerships directly
to the workers.

Under this system, those most affected by the

decisions of the firm do in fact have control over those deci
sions.

Workers are represented at the department level, the com

mittee level, and on the board of directors.

This network of

representation along with stock ownership gives workers a vested
interest in the success of the firm.

Yet even with this ex

tensive network of worker representation and monthly small group
educational meetings, it is not clear whether a sense of unity
and ownership can be felt among the workers enough to improve
their rates of productivity significantly.

Because examples of

massive worker owned, integrated steel mills do not exist, one
can only speculate.

It is possible that workers could feel an

affinity through the programs and components in the model;
however, whether this feeling is likely to occur is difficult to
say.
If the model is indeed hampered by the large expanse of an
integrated steel mill, its effectivenss may lie in minimills.
If a large integrated mill closes down, the workers could buy it
and convert it to several minimills.

The differences between a

minimill and an integrated steel mill lie in its size and its
cost.

liThe efficient size of a steel mill based on blast furnaces

is four to five million tons of output a year, that of a mini
mill using an electric-furnace ranges from 100,000 to 500,000 tons
depending on the variety of its product lines.

11
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Furthermore,
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the total construction costs for minimills

m~y

be less than $50

million.

The total construction cost for a new integrated steel
73
mill is about 4.5 billion.
Because the plant size is much
smaller, minimills might be more effective in involving workers
in ownership.
Like low productivity and high labor costs, lack of invest

ment has hurt steel plants and the workers connected with them.
The majority of steel mills that have shut down in the last
several years have done so because their rate of return was not

hiah enough for the owning conglomerate to continue to reinvest
in the plant.

This occurred in Youngstown, Ohio where the

Lykes Corporation chose to stop investing in the Campbell Works
of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company rather than modernize its
facilities.

This decision caused 4,100 workers to lose their
74
jobs permanently. A similar situation occurred in Weirton, West
Virginia where National Steel decided to stop investing in its
Weirton Steel Mill, threatening the jobs of some 7,000 workers. 75
The workers offered to purchase the plants in both these cases.

They were successful in the latter case but not in the former.
These experiences seem to indicate that the workers, and the
surrounding community have a different objective function than
the conventional corporate owner.

A large corporation is not

I

likely to reinvest in a steel plant if that plant is not achiev
ing a rate of return deemed "acceptable" to the corporation.

The

plant may in fact be profitable, but just not profitable enough.
If the workers, however, do indeed strongly value employment
stability, geographic location, and a sense of community heritage,
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then they are more likely to accept a lower rate of return than
the traditional corporation.

The minimum rate of return workers

would be willing to accept would probably be that needed to
maintain an "adequate" standard of living.

This could mean

th~t

the workers' Ad (the addition to their aspired income for the
current year) is keeping up with the rate of inflation.

Thus

because workers have different priorities and are willing to

ac~

cept a lower rate of return, they will invest beyond the point of a
traditional firm which has its own objective function and more
attractive investment opportunities elsewhere.
In order for workers to provide adequate funds for invest
ment, however, they must see the connection between investment
and their current compensation.

For example, income earned

under the model proposed in this section can be divided into three
(~~

areas. It can be paid out as dividends on the stock shares 1Ad);
it can be paid out in the form of wages (d), or it can be put into
retained

~

earnings~

The link that needs to be pointed out and

understood by all the worker-owners is that the current Ad and d
are the result of contributions made to retained earnings in an
earlier time period.

Thus, if workers want to insure themselves

an adequate wage in the future, they must free up fvnds for "in
vestment now.

Likewise, if workers are concerned about employ

ment stability and community roots, they must not take all the
earnings home in the form of compensation but rather maintain
an adequate savings pool.

Workers, however, will have to be

educated in this type of concern for savings since they have
traditionally not entered into investment decisions within con
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ventional firms.

Under the proposed model, workers will be ed

ucated on their role as entrepreneur and on the virtues of in
vestment through the small groups established to discuss and
acquaint workers with the structure of employee ownership.

Since

these groups meet once a month, lack of understanding can be
cleared up on a continual basis.
In summation, the advantages of employee ownership in
general and this model in particular stem from the fact that they
allow workers to control their own economic futures.

With such

control, workers are more likely to take a reduction in pay
than would be the case in a conventional firm.

Also, with

control over the decision-making process of their plant, the
workers are likely to work with the knowledge that they run the
enterprise and that they directly receive the monetary benefits
of higher productivity.

Furthermore, because a worker owned

plant has different objective functions and priorities than a
conventionally owned firm, the worker owned plant would maintain a
more stable workforce and continue to reinvest in their plant
beyond that of a conventional owner.
However, when these advantages of employee

owner~h,p

are as.

sessed through the context of a large integrated steel mtll,
their outcomes are less clear and less positive. The sheer size
of the plant may hinder workers from feeling that they have any
control over the plant1s decisions or the bureaucracy of rep
resentation may grow so large that workers would once again feel
like workers not owners.

These situations could severely cripple

the cooperative1s ability to significantly increase productivity.

55

In addition, employee owned firms require the union to playa
difficult role, given its current attitude and behavior.

Al

though company unions or separate local unions have the poten
tial to work within an employee owned plant, it remains to be
seen whether they can significantly alter their traditional
union attitude.

The internal organizational model presented in

this section highlights the benefits worker ownership can offer
a capital-intensive steel plant, but at the same time, the model
raises some questions which need to be, but have not been J fully
answered.
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Section VI:

Conclusion

Many factors have contributed to the steel industry's de
cline over the last two decades.

The depletion of local low

cost iron ore deposits caused the price of iron ore to increase
dramatically for U.S. firms, permanently removing a key advantage
over foreign steel producers.

Furthermore, the lack of modern

capital equipment and high labor costs have damaged the American
steel industry's ability to compete with other countries.

As

the industry has continued to lose its share of the world market,
many steel firms have diversified their investments and bought
up firms in other sectors of the economy.

As conglomerates,

these firms efficiently allocate resources and investment funds
to the area providing the highest rate of return.

This has

meant that funds have been transferred from steel plants and put
into higher growth subsidiaries.
The result of this disinvestment has been and continues to
be widespread unemployment among steelworkers in the Midwest and
the Northeast, where most of the old, large integrated steel
mills are concentrated.

Thousands of workers have lost their

jobs because corporations are closing plants that don't make enough
profit.

In addition, many communities are decaying economically

because their major employer--the steel mill--has shut down op
erations.
Worker ownership provides a way to alleviate the regional un
employment problems of steelworkers.

Employee ownership recog
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nizes the difference in the values of steelworkers and conglom
erate owners.

The worker's desire for employment stability often

clashes with the conglomerate's desire for a high rate of return.
Worker ownership switches the existing order around.

It gives

workers the power to decide what rate of return is acceptable
for them and allows them to maintain employment and economic vi
tality in their communities.

Instead of having some far away

corporate headquarters decide the economic fate of thousands of
workers and their respective communities, worker ownership gives
the power of decision to those who are most affected by those
decisions.
In the context of a steel plant, however

t

worker ownership

does result in an explicit trade-off with allocative . ~fficiency.
Because an employee owned steel plant operates with a different
priority or objective function

t

it prohibits the maximum trans

ference of resources into higher growth firms.

Thus, in order

to maintain employment in these geographic regions, some degree
of allocative efficiency will have to be sacrificed.
Yet, it appears that this sacrifice will only take place in
the short-run.

It is quite likely that if a worker owned plant:

became profitable, a large conventionally owned firm with greater
financial resources would offer to buyout its stock shares.at a
profit for the worker.

The

succ~ss

of such a purchase depends on

how tempting the offer is and the age and
the plant worker-owners.

attitud~'comp6sition

Of

If the purchase is successful, the workers

make a handsome profit but the cooperative dies.

In terms of a

steel plant, it is not likely that a worker ownership or tra
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ditional ownership could revive the big, old steel mills to com
pete in today's market in the long-run.

Therefore, the most ef

fective application of worker ownership to steel plants is as a
short-term means of maintaining regional employment and easing the
transition our economy is making out of steel.
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